Member-only story
The Real Reason The Confederacy Lost The Civil War
Not manpower or industrial might but keen strategy
When people talk about the US Civil War and why the South ultimately lost, a lot of attention is given to the population and industrial disparities of the two sides. The South had far fewer people, fewer fighting aged men, fewer railroads, fewer foundries, fewer factories, and fewer urban centers. While these things absolutely played a role, they were not the definitive difference.
Throughout history, small rural countries have managed to thwart larger, more industrial countries continuously. The Vietnamese managed to confound both the French and the Americans for decades despite having far fewer people and industrial might. Similarly, Afghanistan managed to frustrate the Soviet Union and the United States for decades despite being vastly outclassed in terms of people and industry.
Even with their disadvantages, the South managed to hold up against the Union for many years and fought them with nearly equal prowess, winning many large battles and fielding similarly sized armies. There was another thing that tanked the South’s ability to win the war that is usually mentioned but never harped on. The South did have a massive disadvantage, but it wasn’t in population or spinning looms — it was in ships.
The Civil War was not won or lost on the battlefields like Gettysburg, Atlanta, or Corinth. It was lost on the water in places like Cape Fear, Cairo, and the Mississippi River. Because while the South was able to field armies capable of sparring with the Union, it was utterly incapable of fielding any sort of navy. And that made all of the difference.
The North always knew that it had a distinct advantage in the realm of naval matters over the South. That is why the Anaconda Plan was rolled out with high hopes. The plan called for an overall blockade of the South using the North’s ample naval assets. Ports such as Jacksonville, Charleston, and New Orleans could easily be choked off, which would deprive the South of vital trade and transportation. The plan was called such as it was hoped that the blockade would envelop and strangle the South like a gigantic snake.
